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The concept of human dignity is widely used in contemporary ethics and law as a 
foundational criterion for moral reasoning. Nonetheless, the concept has recently received 
criticism from various quarters. Some of this criticism has come from representatives of the 
animal liberation movement. The concept of human dignity is accused of underpinning an 
ethics that is anthropocentric and speciesist. That is, human dignity is said to be used as the 
basis of an ultimately unjustifiable attribution of intrinsic moral worth only to human beings 
and to lead, consequently, to a detrimental prejudice against other species.   
This article acknowledges that the critiques of so-called anthropocentricism and its 
often attendant speciesism should be taken seriously. Nevertheless, the article argues that the 
language of anthropocentric versus supposedly non-anthropocentric ethics sets up a false 
dichotomy. This dichotomy leads to mistaken calls for the dismissal of, in fact, very useful 
anthropocentric, i.e. ‘human-centred’, concepts, like the concept of human dignity, from our 
ethical discourse.  
Given the ethical usefulness of concepts like human dignity, this article endeavours to 
outline the beginnings of a ‘human-centred’ ethics, based on an adequate understanding of 
the concept of human dignity, that, nevertheless, avoids the traps of anthropocentricism and 
speciesism. That is, this article aims to demonstrate how a ‘human-centred’, and in this sense 
epistemologically and morally ‘anthropocentric’, ethics need not necessarily be an ethics in 
which only human beings have some kind of intrinsic moral worth. In so doing, the article 
proposes a human-centred ethics that overcomes the false dichotomy that has been set up 
between supposedly anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric ethics, whilst still being able to 
advocate for the rights of animals.  
To do this, the article first provides a brief introduction to the critique of so-called 
anthropocentricism, and to the idea of speciesism. In light of this, the article then elaborates 
the above claim that this discourse of anthropocentricism versus non-anthropocetrism (or 
zoocentrism, biocentrism or ecocentrism) sets up a false dichotomy. This constitutes an 
important methodological presupposition for what is to follow in the rest of the article. 
Second, the article considers the importance of the concept of human dignity in contemporary 
law and ethics. The third section will trace some of the recent criticism that has arisen 
surrounding the use and meaning of the concept of human dignity, and consider the variety of 
understandings of the concept of human dignity at play in contemporary discourse. The 
fourth section will focus more specifically on the animal liberationist perspective of Peter 
Singer and his proposed alternative to human dignity, namely, a dignity of persons. The fifth 
section will argue for the importance of a multidimensional understanding of human dignity 
in response to these critiques, before the sixth, concluding section works out some of the 
implications of such an understanding as the possible basis of a non-speciesist, yet 
nevertheless, human-centred ethics. 
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1. Anthropocentrism and Speciesism 
In animal rights and animal liberation discourse, the adjective ‘anthropocentric’ is 
generally used to connote an unjustifiable moral bias or chauvinism in favour of human 
beings. From this perspective, an anthropocentric ethic is one in which only human beings 
have intrinsic moral worth, and everything else, including animals and the natural 
environment more generally, has only instrumental value for human beings.1 Not 
surprisingly, in such discourse, the term has taken on a negative connotation: it is morally bad 
to be ‘anthropocentric’.  
A supposedly non-anthropocentric ethics, by contrast, widens the circle of value by 
attributing moral worth to other living beings or even to the natural world more generally. 
Depending on the approach, this can range from other animals who share some human-like 
attributes, such as the great apes, dolphins or other mammals,2 to everything that exists, for 
example, in Deep Ecology.3 
In the realm of environmental ethics, much of the blame for the environmental crises 
currently being experienced around the world, and the ineffectiveness of attempts to get 
people to do anything about them, is levelled at anthropocentrism. Indeed, it is probably 
environmental ethics, rather than animal liberation ethics, that initially lifts the veil on the 
problems of unbridled human chauvinism, albeit, incongruously, by pointing to the 
detrimental consequences of environmental degradation for humankind.  
In tune with the expanding circle of moral concern that characterised the Zeitgeist of 
the 1960s, Rachel Carson’s seminal series of articles in The New Yorker magazine in 1962 
and its later publication as the book, Silent Spring,4 was well received by American 
audiences. Carson raised the awareness of the effects that pesticides were having on the 
environment, especially on bird populations. She rightly criticised the arrogance of the 
anthropocentric assumption that the natural world existed only for the utilisation of human 
beings. Yet, whilst this message almost certainly found favour, it would largely have been the 
implication of the potential harm that lethal pesticides like DDT might be doing to humans 
that really got people interested. Thus, contemporary environmental ethics is characterised by 
both supposedly non-anthropocentric views that emphasise the intrinsic value of nature, and 
anthropocentric or human-centred views, where the concern for the environment is closely 
tied with concern for human flourishing.5 
Alongside the environmental movement, and itself in tune with the same expanding 
circle of moral concern, the 1970s saw the rise of the animal liberation movement. Unlike the 
animal welfare movement, which really starts much earlier in the nineteenth century, and 
which allows the use of non-human animals for human ends, the animal liberation movement 
opposes any such chauvinistic utilisation of animals. Broadly speaking, two strands can be 
identified. The first is Peter Singer’s utilitarian argument, following Bentham, that since 
animals can experience pain, human beings should not cause them unnecessary suffering.6 
The second is Tom Regan’s deontological argument, inspired by Kant, that advocates the 
intrinsic value of non-human animals as ends in themselves.7  
It was the animal liberation movement—taking its cue from earlier movements to 
abolish human slavery—that coined and embraced the terms speciesism and speciesist, or 
                                               
1 diZerega ‘Empathy, Society, Nature, and the Relational Self: Deep Ecology and Liberal Modernity’ 1995 
Social Theory and Practice 21 at 240. 
2 E.g. Regan The Case for Animal Rights (1983).  
3 E.g. Naess Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle (1989). 
4 Carson Silent Spring (1962). 
5 Hay Main Currents in Western Environmental Thought (2002), ch 2. 
6 Singer Animal Liberation (1975) 
7 See text accompanying n 2. 
3 
 
speciest. These terms, supposedly akin to the terms ‘racist’ or ‘sexist’, imply that an 
anthropocentric ethics unjustifiably prejudices one species over others in the same way that 
an ethics that favours a particular race or sex is racist or sexist.  
Notwithstanding the validity of observations that unbridled human chauvinism has led 
to environmental destruction and non-human suffering, the present contribution argues that 
the apparent distinction that has arisen between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric 
ethics just outlined, particularly with respect to the treatment of animals, is unhelpful because 
it establishes a false dichotomy between humans and other creatures. It assumes that an ethics 
must either have humans as its central focus or other creatures/nature as its focus. Thus, the 
dichotomy appears to imply that an ethics that takes the moral worth of human beings as a 
foundational starting point of ethical reflection—such as an ethics founded on the concept of 
human dignity—cannot at the same time give credence to the moral (as opposed to purely 
instrumental) worth of other creatures and their lives. This dichotomy is false both on 
epistemological and moral grounds.  
It is false, first of all, because all ethics is arguably epistemologically anthropocentric, 
i.e., it is human beings who are engaging in moral reasoning based on what they know of or 
can imagine about themselves and the world around them. From this perspective, to say that 
an ethics is anthropocentric is not the same as saying that there is an unjustifiable bias in 
favour of human beings.8 Rather, it is to say that such an ethics proceeds from the assumption 
that being human (from the Greek anthropos) is the central fact of one’s reality and the point 
of reference for all one’s moral thought and behaviour. This is an epistemological assumption 
and not a moral one.  
Secondly, it is also false because an ethics that proceeds from the moral assumption that 
human beings have fundamental moral worth (or dignity) and are the primary ends of moral 
behaviour does not necessarily preclude the possibility of extending non-instrumental, 
intrinsic value, worth or dignity to other beings.9 It is the beginnings of such an ethics—
founded on the concept of human dignity—that the present contribution aims to articulate.  
To avoid any confusion, I will use the term ‘human-centred’ when referring to the kind 
of non-speciesist yet nevertheless epistemologically and morally anthropocentric ethics that I 
am advocating. This is to be contrasted with the now conventional, and somewhat negative, 
understanding of ‘anthropocentric’ as referring to ethics that unjustifiably takes only human 
beings as having moral worth. 
 
2. The Concept of Human Dignity in Contemporary Ethical 
and Legal Discourse 
 
2.1 The Rise of the Concept of Human Dignity 
 
Since the end of the Second World War, human dignity has become a concept central to 
much of our contemporary ethical and legal discourse. People turned to the concept of human 
dignity— an affirmation of the fundamental intrinsic worth of every human person—in an 
effort to create legislation that would make a repeat of the atrocities of the war and the 
Holocaust impossible. Thus, the 1945 Charter of the United Nations Organisation states that 
the organisation seeks to ‘save future generations from the scourge of war’ and, among other 
things, ‘reaffirm faith in . . . the dignity and worth of the human person . . ..’  
                                               
8 See Fox Toward a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism (1990) at 20-
22. 
9 E.g. see Hargrove ‘Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value’ 1992 The Monist 75 at 183-207. 
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It is probably the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) that has had 
the most abiding impact. Despite the debates about the legal status of the document in 
international law, its succinctness and accessibility has made it an important catalyst in 
efforts to recognise and protect human dignity around the world, be it in civil rights 
movements, indigenous rights movements, the anti-apartheid struggle, and perhaps most 
recently the so-called Arab Spring. Article 1 of the UDHR states, ‘All human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and 
should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.’ Note, however, the implicit 
connection between human dignity, reason and conscience in this statement, which, as we 
shall see below, poses potential problems that are capitalized on by animal liberationists in 
their critique of the concept of human dignity. 
The two 1966 UN International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
and on Civil and Political Rights, which only entered into force in 1976, both state in their 
preambles that the rights contained therein are derived from the inherent dignity of the human 
person.  There is an important shift in language here from human beings to human persons. 
The importance of this shift will be seen in the analysis of liberationist critiques of the 
concept of human dignity that ask whether personhood need necessarily be a human quality. 
The rise of the concept of human dignity in international law, and its use in various, 
admittedly human, liberation movements since the promulgation of the UDHR, has also led 
to its inclusion as a fundamental principle in numerous post-war constitutions. The concept 
also found its way into the South African Constitution. Chapter 1, section 1 names human 
dignity as the first of the republic’s founding values. Section 10 in chapter 2, the Bill of 
Rights, states, ‘Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and 
protected.’ 
 
2.2 The Importance of the Concept of Human Dignity 
 
The South African constitution is highlighted here because it provides an example of 
just how useful the concept of human dignity can be in preventing the kinds of atrocities that 
the drafters of the UDHR had hoped it would. It was partly an appeal the concept of human 
dignity that underpinned the abolition of the death penalty in South Africa. 
Justice Kate O’Regan10 of the South African Constitutional Court argued that dignity is 
very specifically about affirming the value of all human beings as human beings. In other 
words, it is not simply about being alive (enshrined in section 11 of the 1996 constitution),11 
but about being able to live in a certain way, namely, in a way that is worthy of a human 
being. 
Apartheid was a system based on the denial of a common human dignity. This system 
sought to ensure a life worthy of human beings for some human beings by denying the worth 
of other human beings. It employed various tools to reinforce the idea that some people did 
not possess the same inherent worth or dignity as others. One of these tools was the death 
penalty. Although the death penalty could be applied as punishment to people of any race, the 
‘death sentence was imposed sometimes for crimes that were motivated by political ideals. In 
this way the death penalty came to be seen by some as part of the repressive machinery of the 
former government.’12 Moreover, the death penalty not only put an end to a life, it denied the 
                                               
10 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 327-337 
11 Note that O’Regan refers to s 9, which is where the right to life appears in the 1993 or so-called ‘interim’ 
constitution. 
12 S v Makwanyane (n 10) para 333. 
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worth of that life; it rejected the idea that the person being put to death had any dignity worth 
respecting or protecting.13 
Thus, though unapologetically human-centred, there can be little doubt that the concept 
of human dignity has not only become enshrined in national and international law, but is 
indeed useful, if only some of the time, as a touchstone for furthering the kind of society that 
the founders of the United Nations and the drafters of the South African Constitution 
envisioned, namely, a just, free and peaceful society.14  
 
3. The Critique of Human Dignity 
 
Despite the evident usefulness of the concept of human dignity, it is not without its 
critics, who have questioned both its usefulness and its philosophical underpinnings. Critics 
have declared human dignity to be useless, vacuous and even just plain stupid.15  In the field 
of animal ethics, one of the most vocal critics of the concept is Peter Singer. 
Singer captures the sentiments of many recent critics of human dignity when he states, 
‘Philosophers frequently introduce ideas of dignity, respect, and worth at the point at which 
reasons appear to be lacking, but this is hardly good enough. Fine phrases are the last resort 
of those who have run out of arguments.’16  
The cause of such ‘last resorts’ may ironically lie in the language of human rights itself. 
The rise of a human rights culture has led to competing rights claims and a culture of trying 
to trump one person’s right claim with a bigger, better right claim. As we have seen, 
however, these rights are commonly thought to have their basis in the concept of human 
dignity, and so, when opposing sides try to justify why their right claim is more important, 
they both end up appealing the same concept, i.e. human dignity, leading invariably to an 
unconstructive deadlock.  
Yet, Singer’s concern extends beyond this. His concern is not so much that one uses the 
concept of human dignity to claim that all human beings are equal. He is really concerned 
with the often unspoken implication of such claims, namely, that human beings are superior 
to all other animals.17 In his 1975 book Animal Liberation, Singer states, ‘Faced with a 
situation in which they see a need for some basis for the moral gulf that is commonly thought 
to separate humans and animals, but can find no concrete difference that will do this without 
undermining the equality of humans, philosophers tend to waffle. They resort to high-
sounding phrases like “the intrinsic dignity of the human individual.”’18 Thus, for Singer, 
there is a problematic moral contradiction in certain positions that appeal to human dignity. 
He would find it morally contradictory to appeal to the idea of human dignity to oppose, for 
example, abortion,19 euthanasia, the death penalty or even infanticide, and at the same time 
condone—or even encourage, as in recent Australian advertising campaigns promoting the 
eating of red meat—the slaughter of billions of animals. For Singer, given that a human 
                                               
13 See Id para 334-335. 
14 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, preamble. 
15 Bagaric and Allan ‘The Vacuous Concept of Dignity’ 2006  Journal of Human Rights 5 at 257-270; Macklin 
‘Dignity Is a Useless Concept’ 2003 BMJ 327 at 1419-1420; Pinker ‘The Stupidity of Dignity’ 2008 New 
Republic 238 at 28-31. 
16 Singer ‘All Animals Are Equal’ in Singer (ed) Applied Ethics (1986) at 228. 
17 Singer ‘Speciesism and Moral Status’ 2009 Metaphilosophy 40 at 567-581. 
18 Singer (n 6) 266-267. 
19 Interestingly, abortion is legal in South Africa, and indeed in other countries, where human dignity is 
enshrined in the constitution. Nonetheless, there are ethical positions, particularly religiously-inspired ones that 
extend inviolable dignity to the foetus from the moment of conception, and would therefore oppose this legal 
status. 
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embryo or infant, or a person in a persistent vegetative state, would have fewer capacities, 
including especially a capacity to suffer, at the moment it is killed in comparison with an 
adult pig at the moment it is slaughtered, such positions require careful justification. If human 
dignity is the basis of these justifications, then what constitutes human dignity? 
 
3.1 The Varieties of Human Dignity 
 
When one starts to interrogate the basis for claims of human dignity, one discovers a 
variety of different approaches (table 1). First, there are those who maintain that human 
dignity is inherent and inviolable, something human beings always already have. This group 
can be broken up into two sub-groups: species membership and capacities. Second there are 
those who think of human dignity more as something that is mutable, and which is acquired 
or realised during the course of one’s life. These too can be broken up into two subgroups: 
self-worth and behaviour.20  
 
Table 1: The Varieties of Human Dignity 
 
1. Dignity Human Beings Always 
Already Have 2. Dignity that Human Beings Acquire 
a. Species Membership a. Self-worth 
b. Some Capacity b. Behaviour 
 
 
3.1.1 Dignity as Something Human Beings Always Already Have 
 
Broadly speaking, when, as in the first group (1), human dignity is talked about as 
something all human beings already inherently have, as a sort of ontological inviolable worth, 
the arguments underpinning these claims can be distinguished into two kinds.  
The first kind (1a) argues that all human beings have dignity simply because they 
belong to the human species. Examples might range from a religiously-inspired idea that 
human beings are created in the image and likeness of God, and are hence the crown of 
creation, to a more neo-Darwinist perspective that might claim that it is natural to favour the 
survival of one’s own species over others, and that hence one’s own species has a special 
worth over against any instrumental or even intrinsic value that other species may have.   
The second kind (1b) tries to argue that human beings have dignity because of 
particular capacities supposedly unique to human beings. The most common capacity 
appealed to is human reason, as intimated above with reference to article 1 of the UDHR. 
Others might include autonomy, conscience, or even the capacity to love. Such an 
                                               
20 Kirchhoffer and Dierickx ‘Human Dignity and Human Tissue: A Meaningful Ethical Relationship?’ 2011 
Journal of Medical Ethics 37 at 552-556. 
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understanding may underlie the apparent paradox found in countries that uphold the 
universality of human dignity, but nevertheless permit abortion, because a foetus is said not 
yet to possess the dignity-affording capacities. On the other hand, hybrids of the species-
membership and capacities arguments also exist that would argue that foetuses, like infants, 
have the potential to possess and exercise these capacities and therefore should be treated as 
already possessing inviolable human dignity.  
Religiously-inspired and especially Judeo-Christian arguments basing dignity in the 
belief in creation in the image of God (which Singer sees as a third category)21 actually tend 
to fall into one or other of these two depending on the emphasis. With regard to those who 
ground dignity in species membership, in addition to the idea of being the crown of creation, 
one might argue that God’s incarnation as a human being in the person of Jesus, and his death 
and resurrection for the salvation of human beings, underpins the dignity of all human beings. 
With regard to those religious arguments that ground dignity in a specific capacity, the belief 
in creation in the image of God might be taken to mean that human beings have been 
uniquely created with God’s attributes, among which are reason, freedom, and love, for 
example.22   
 
3.1.2 Dignity as Something Human Beings Acquire 
 
In addition to views that describe human dignity as some immutable worth already 
present in all human beings, there are those that conceive of human dignity in a more mutable 
sense. 
First among these are those positions that understand human dignity as (2a) something 
more akin to a sense of pride in oneself or a conscious sense of one's own worth as a human 
being living a meaningful life, worthy of the respect of others.  
Secondly, there are those who focus not so much on one’s own sense of self-worth, but 
on the realisation of one’s human dignity through one’s moral behaviour (2b). We often 
speak, for example, of dignified behaviour, or living or dying with dignity.  
Interesting among these latter approaches to human dignity is Avishai Margalit’s idea 
that, unlike for Cicero, dignity is not the honour that accrues to virtuous behaviour or social 
status but the “type of honor that people ought to have . . . .”, a sense of self-respect, and a 
life in a decent society free of, and this is the key point, humiliation.23  
 
4. Singer’s Proposal: The Dignity of Persons 
 
Singer’s criticism of the concept of human dignity, regardless of which ground is used 
according to the discussion above, amounts to an accusation of speciesism. This is obvious in 
any argument that simply grounds human dignity in species membership alone. However, 
even the capacity argument can be seen as speciesist, if not in its argument then at least in the 
apparent hypocrisy: if human dignity has its foundation in, for example, the supposedly 
human capacity of reason, then, according to Singer, only those human beings who 
demonstrate some measure of this reason should be said to have human dignity. If, however, 
as is usually the case, this same dignity is extended to all members of the species regardless 
                                               
21 See n 17. 
22 Kirchhoffer ‘Become What You Are: On the Value of the Concept of Human Dignity as an Ethical Criterion 
in Light of Contemporary Critiques’ 2009 Bijdragen 70 at 45-66. 
23 Margalit The Decent Society (1996). 
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of whether they actually demonstrate this capacity, for example, infants or the profoundly 
mentally disabled, then, according to Singer, this is simply speciesist: the human species has 
dignity because most members of the human species have the capacity to reason. Singer 
argues that since some animals possess intellectual capacities equivalent or better than human 
infants, or people with mental disabilities, and in some cases perhaps even mental capacities 
better than most human adults, to situate human dignity in particular capacities and 
nevertheless to exclude members of other species that display similar qualities is speciesist: it 
is an unjustifiable prejudice against those who are not like those who currently wield power 
in the world.  
Singer proposes a solution to the problem based on sentience. Singer, following the 
utilitarian argument of Jeremy Bentham, asks, ‘Can they suffer?’ If they can suffer, then they 
have an interest in not suffering, an interest in experiencing pleasure rather than pain.24 The 
capacity to suffer thus replaces reason as the basic ground of any claim for equal 
consideration. Instead of human dignity, this view might defend a dignity of persons where 
not all human beings are persons, and not all persons are human beings (cf. the language of 
persons in the 1966 UN Covenants mentioned above). 
 
4.1 The Problems with Singer’s Proposal 
 
Three issues arise with Singer’s proposal: the danger of reductionism and the danger of 
the lowest common denominator. 
 
4.1.1 Reductionism 
 
In her critique of the concept of human dignity, bioethicist Ruth Macklin argues that 
human dignity is a useless concept because, in reality, when people refer to it, they actually 
mean something else. So, for example, considering those who might ground human dignity in 
a particular capacity such as human autonomy, respect for human dignity essentially just 
means respect for human autonomy. That being the case, according to Macklin, there is no 
need to refer to dignity because one can just as easily and with more clarity refer to respect 
for the choices a person makes about her own life.25  
A similar critique could be levelled at any attempt to situate a supposedly non-
speciesist dignity of persons (as opposed to of human beings) in the ability to suffer, or in any 
other specific ability. Suffering is a useful and important moral category in its own right. 
Suffering is never good, and should be avoided. But suffering per se is not morally bad even 
if is bad at an ontic level. Thus, though suffering should always be taken into account as a 
morally relevant category, absolutising the avoidance of suffering by making it the ground of 
a dignity of persons risks making the notion of dignity of persons itself meaningless. If 
suffering is what is at stake, why refer to dignity at all? 
 Moreover, few theories of values—including Singer’s own utilitarian approach—
would ever propose that suffering be avoided at all costs. It may be morally necessary for the 
achievement of morally good ends. For example, cutting off someone’s leg is causing that 
someone suffering; however, it may be morally necessary to preserve the good of the 
person’s life in the case of gangrene.  
                                               
24 See n 17. 
25 See n 15. 
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I would argue that the concept of dignity, on the other hand, serves a different function. 
It affirms the worth of the thing itself, and hence the idea that that thing is a moral good in its 
own right, rather than because of any utility it may have. Situating dignity in the ability to 
suffer would make any meaningful discussion of the value of suffering in certain 
circumstances impossible, since all suffering becomes morally bad. Moreover, reducing 
dignity to the ability to suffer begs the question why one should talk about the dignity or the 
worth of the thing itself at all, since it is clearly only the pain or suffering that the thing has to 
endure that is of moral concern in a utilitarian calculus.  
 
4.1.2 The Lowest Common Denominator 
 
The second danger in using sentience as the basis for attributing dignity to ‘persons’ is 
that dignity is not only reduced to a single capacity, but is reduced to that capacity which 
offers a lowest common denominator. When this happens, dignity again becomes useless as 
an ethical criterion because it offers no way of discerning between the right and the wrong 
thing to do when there are competing interests. In other words, dignity of persons is not more 
useful (and is arguably even less useful) than the concept of human dignity because, when 
one needs to adjudicate between competing interests or competing rights claims, one is left 
with both sides being able to claim that their interests or rights are grounded in the dignity of 
persons (even if sentient animals still can’t actually make that claim themselves). 
 
4.1.3 Still Speciesist 
 
Moreover, what about those outside the circle? In other words, has this really resolved 
the issue of speciesism? At what point does one draw the line of sentience? And a line must 
be drawn if we are going to be talking about some basis for ‘equal’ consideration.  Could we 
not just as easily assert that all living things have an interest in being alive? This would surely 
solve the problem of speciesism, and it might even be possible to thereby assert some 
intrinsic moral value to all living things, and even to systems of living things. Then, however, 
one would not be able to distinguish between the interests of a human being in a persistent 
vegetative state, a mature human adult, an amoeba, and an oak tree. All have an equal interest 
in being alive. As soon as one admits of other reasons why a pvs patient, for example, should 
be allowed to live and an amoeba or oak tree not, one has introduced either other criteria—
which risks the charge of speciesism—or other modes of reasoning. Singer, for example, uses 
a utilitarian calculation aimed at minimising unnecessary suffering. However, once one does 
this, it makes little sense to talk about intrinsic moral worth anymore. There is nothing 
particularly controversial about the idea of wanting to minimise unnecessary suffering. The 
animal welfare movement, and indeed the laws of many countries assert as much without any 
appeal to the worth or dignity of animals.   
 
5. Retrieving a Multidimensional Understanding of Human 
Dignity  
 
Whilst acknowledging the problems with the concept of human dignity as highlighted 
in s 3 above, I do not believe that an alternative concept of dignity of persons based in some 
other cognitive capacity or the ability to suffer offers a solution to the problem. Even though 
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such an approach might appear to extend moral status to all creatures capable of suffering, 
such an approach overcomes none of the criticisms levelled at human dignity. First, since it is 
grounded in only one capacity, as Macklin has argued, one might as well just speak about that 
capacity itself instead of resorting to, as Singer himself put it, ‘fine phrases’. Secondly, it 
does not offer any assistance as a criterion in adjudicating between competing rights claims. 
Finally, because it still situates worth in a particular capacity, it cannot avoid excluding those 
species that do not demonstrate this capacity. 
Moreover, as we have seen in s 2, human dignity is not only a widespread concept but a 
useful one. Therefore, one would be somewhat reluctant to see it dismissed out of hand. The 
question then is, if we want to preserve some place for the concept of human dignity in law 
and ethics, can we use this concept as the basis of a human-centred ethic that nevertheless 
avoids speciesism? 
The answer, I maintain, is ‘yes’, provided we consider human dignity as a 
multidimensional concept that affirms the worth of multidimensional human beings and their 
multidimensional moral behaviour.  
 
5.1 All Ethics Is Epistemologically Anthropocentric 
 
In some respects, the negative connotation that anthropocentricism has taken on in 
animal and environmental ethics is misguided. As already laid out in s 1, whilst 
acknowledging that human arrogance and hubris have a great deal for which to answer, even 
the most ‘non-anthropocentric’ ethic is always epistemologically anthropocentric. It is human 
beings who are doing the thinking and the philosophising about what is or is not morally 
appropriate behaviour. In saying this, I do not want to preclude the possibility that animals 
may also do this, but at this stage, we cannot know that they do this. All we can know is what 
we think about ourselves and our place in relation to each other, to other animals and to the 
rest of creation.  
With moral imagination, we can, it is true, put ourselves in the position of an animal in 
a factory farm, but it is we who are doing the imagining. I have a great deal of sympathy for 
Thomas Berry’s evocative image of a parliament of creatures: ‘If there were a parliament of 
creatures, its first decision might well be to vote the humans out of the community, too 
deadly a presence to tolerate any further.’26 Yet, the power of this image comes from our 
ability to imagine it, and to attribute human qualities, such as the ability to participate in such 
a parliament, to other animals. Thus, even an unequivocally non-anthropocentric, ecocentric 
ethic like Berry’s remains epistemologically anthropocentric. 
In this respect, the term ‘speciesist’ should not carry the same negative connotations as 
racist or sexist. We cannot talk to the animals. By this I do not mean simply that we do not 
have a language with which we can communicate. Different languages exist in human 
communities too, yet, they can find ways to communicate. Language barriers can be 
overcome and people can really reason with one another about moral issues. One can even 
communicate at a sophisticated level with the unborn and with the deceased via written 
media. Singer enters into discussion with Bentham, and in the future, it is quite conceivable 
that a person not yet born may enter the same conversation. This cannot be said of other non-
human animals. A parliament is a real possibility for human beings, but a parliament of 
creatures is likely to always remain impossible. At some level, of course, I can communicate 
with my dog. She can respond to my affection, for example, and I to her’s. But I can never 
reason with my dog, and explain to her that chasing the neighbour’s cat is morally bad 
                                               
26 Thomas Berry, The Dream of the Earth (1988), 209. 
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because the cat has an equal interest as the dog in avoiding unnecessary suffering. I can do 
this with human beings, and indeed this is precisely what Singer is seeking to do.   
Note that this has nothing to do with the moral status of my dog. I am not suggesting 
that the dog has no moral status because she is unable to reason. This is an epistemological 
point. Ethics is ‘human-centred’ because we are always trying to understand our own moral 
status and the moral status of other creatures, and indeed of the natural and technological 
world, in relation to ourselves. If we conclude that factory farming is morally wrong, or that 
the suffering of animals is morally relevant, or even that they have some sort of intrinsic 
moral worth, it is nevertheless always we who do so. 
Of course, the question that arises, then, is what are the implications of this necessary 
epistemological human-centredness in our ethical discourse for the treatment of animals? The 
key point in this regard is that it is possible for human beings to imagine the suffering of 
animals and to conclude that this is morally wrong. This possibility alone, of course, does not 
impose a moral obligation on human beings to care for animals. What is needed is a human-
centred ethic where the very status of human beings as the moral (and not just 
epistemological) centre of ethical reflection is dependent upon acknowledging and acting 
upon the intrinsic moral value of non-human animals. The next section addresses the 
philosophical anthropological basis of such an ethic.  
 
5.2 Human Beings Are Multidimensional Realities 
 
Human beings are historically-situated corporeal subjects in relation to all that is. 
Human beings are subjects not objects as they have free choice and the ability to act and 
reflect on those choices. At the same time, they are corporeal because their subjectivity is a 
necessarily embodied one. Human subjectivity and corporeality cannot be separated from one 
another. This being embodied means also that human beings are always already situated in 
relationship to the world, to other human beings, to social institutions, to transcendence and 
to time and history. This means that they are also historical beings, that is, beings who change 
over time physically and mentally in themselves as individuals and as moral and political 
communities, and are aware of these changes.27  
One of the fundamental errors that many criticisms of human dignity make, as we have 
seen above, is that they seek to situate human dignity in one or other feature of the human 
being. This misses the point of the concept, namely to affirm the value of the 
multidimensional Gestalt that is each human being. 
 In this respect, human dignity is not one or other of the grounds discussed in s 3 above, 
but indeed all of these held together in a complex tension. Human dignity is both something 
human beings already have and something they acquire: members of the species (1a in table 
1) homo sapiens, already have a broad range of capacities (1b) that make it possible for them 
to realise a sense of self-worth (2a) through morally good behaviour in relationship to a 
society (2b). None of these can be realistically separated from the others. It makes no sense to 
speak of dignity only as a conscious sense of self-worth, for example, because self-worth 
presupposes the capacities necessary to realise a sense of self-worth and the behavioural 
means to achieve it in a society of similarly disposed beings who would see the value of who 
one is and what one does. Moreover, all of this requires time: time to develop one’s 
capacities, to learn about society, to grow morally, and to work out what is meaningful in life.  
Thus, it is not because people can reason or love that we attribute dignity to them, but 
because they have the potential to do both of these and more. It is not only because people are 
                                               
27 Janssens ‘Artificial Insemination: Ethical Considerations’ 1980 Louvain Studies 8 at 3-29. 
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free that we attribute dignity but also because they are aware of their limitations in a material 
universe. From a religious perspective, it is not just because human beings are created by a 
loving God that they have dignity, but also because they are able to see and further the 
goodness of God in all creation. It is not just because human beings are members of the 
species homo sapiens that they have dignity, but because being part of this species entails 
participating in this remarkable combination of features in an historical world, in particular 
relationships, over time. An infant doesn’t have dignity just because it is an infant, but 
because it has a lifetime of unique opportunities for growth and interaction ahead of it. An 
old person doesn’t just have dignity because they require constant care, but because they have 
a history, a story that has been lived and told.  Thus, human dignity is not just an affirmation 
of a fundamental human moral equality, but also an affirmation of the importance of the 
uniqueness of every individual, genetically, socially, historically, behaviourally, 
intellectually, and so on.  
The implication of this multidimensional understanding of human dignity, that is the 
basis of human moral worth, because it takes meaning and time into account, is also that 
human beings are profoundly moral beings. In other words, the idea that all ethics is 
epistemologically human-centred is possible only because, as moral beings, human beings are 
interested in ethics in the first place.  
 
5.3 Human Beings are Moral Beings 
 
It is this multidimensional being-in-historical-relationship that makes human beings 
uniquely moral beings, that is, beings who reflect on the moral meaning of their world and 
their behaviour in it. We are faced with choices of moral import on an almost daily basis, and 
we have various ways of navigating our way through these. The law is one of those ways of 
navigating through the moral nature of our world. By moral here, I mean that our interactions 
with the world affect how we perceive ourselves as living good and meaningful lives, 
something that I believe we all fundamentally desire. We all want to feel like we are living a 
dignified life. It is worth recalling here the second group of grounds for human dignity 
concerning self-worth and behaviour (s 3.1.2). We don’t just want to do the right thing 
because other people will approve. We also want to do the right thing because we will feel 
good about ourselves.  
What follows will set out some of the moral implications for animal ethics of the 
epistemological human-centredness of ethics in light of a multidimensional understanding of 
human dignity, that is as an affirmation of the moral worth of each human Gestalt. 
 
6. Conclusion: Towards a Non-speciesist Human-Centred 
Ethic 
 
The implications of grounding human dignity as a fundamental value in such a 
multidimensional understanding of the human person as a historically-situated meaning-
seeking and meaning-making being in relation to all that is are threefold.  
 
6.1 Human-centred Is Not Necessarily Speciesist 
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First, a human-centred ethic is not necessarily speciesist. Indeed, one might go so far as 
to argue that if one takes this multidimensional being-in-relationship adequately into account, 
many of the ways in which human beings currently treat not only animals but also their 
natural environment more generally are not philosophically sustainable.  
For example, whilst it may not be possible using such an ethic to extend an equivalent 
dignity to non-human animals, it is nevertheless impossible not to acknowledge that human 
beings have a meaningful moral relationship to other species, such that it would be self-
defeating in the long run to think that human dignity can be fulfilled in a world that is wholly 
objectified and seen as having no intrinsic value of its own. 
 Just as an adequately multidimensional understanding of human dignity means that any 
effort to realise a sense of self-worth by diminishing the dignity of others—for example, 
Apartheid’s use of the death penalty to dehumanise black South Africans (s 1.2)—is 
unacceptable, so too, any attempt to realise a sense of human worth that relies on the 
diminishment of the intrinsic goodness of creation as a whole and of non-human animals in 
particular is flawed.  
To claim that that with which I am in relationship has no intrinsic value of its own that 
is worthy of my respect undermines any claim I may make regarding my own worth, since it 
is only by virtue of my already being in relationship with other beings, other objects, and with 
time itself that I am even able to exist to make such a claim. By working for the good of the 
existence of things in general, I work for the realisation of my own dignity.   
In other words, though ethics is human-centred in the sense that it has to do with my 
moral meaning-making and activity in the world— as well as the moral meaning-making of 
my human community—my good, my worth, my dignity, cannot be realised if no worth is 
attributed to others. Just as it is absurd to suggest that human dignity only has to do with my 
dignity, so too it is absurd to suggest that human moral worth, and human goodness, can be 
achieved only by taking human worth into account. As beings in relationship to all that is, our 
worth is always already dependent upon our relationship to human and non-human others, to 
the world, to institutions, to history, and to transcendence.  
To be morally good, and thus to realise the fullness of one’s dignity, requires that one 
extend the circle of one’s moral concern to all with which one is relationship. To not do so, is 
to undermine one’s own claim to moral worth. Thus, instead of arguing for animal or 
environmental rights on the basis of a nihilistic claim that humans are no more important than 
anything else in the world and therefore have no right to use and abuse for their own ends 
(which could arguably just as easily be taken as an argument that they have every right to do 
so), I am arguing that by taking human beings and their moral meaning-making as of central 
importance, one must necessarily extend the circle of moral value and concern to all of 
creation because it is philosophically and hence morally impossible not to do so without 
undermining one’s own claim to moral worth. 
 
6.2 Multidimensionality Allows Affirmation of the Worth of All 
Human Beings 
 
Secondly, and in a similar vein, this being-in-relationship means that one can still 
uphold the fundamental equality of consideration for all human beings, even those who do 
not display some of the more classic features of, for example, reason, like those who are 
intellectually disabled. As human beings, they, like all human beings, are multidimensional 
historically-situated beings who are, if not themselves capable of seeking and making 
meaning, at the very least the subjects of the meaning seeking of others. In other words, this 
multidimensional understanding of human dignity means that even if some of the dimensions 
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are not fully developed or are not being expressed, one can still affirm the fundamental worth 
of the whole.  
At the same time, this does not preclude giving due to consideration to animals as 
having their own intrinsic worth as beings with which one is in relationship.  
Thus, Singer’s concern that claims of human dignity are speciesist because they afford 
protection to people with severe mental disabilities whilst allowing the slaughter of sentient 
animals is legitimate if one only takes sentience as the basis for dignity. If, however, one 
understands the claim for human dignity in the multidimensional manner that I have outlined 
above, then, both the way we treat the mentally disabled and sentient animals is morally 
important, instead of either one or the other. On this view, contra Singer, neither the killing of 
people with mental disabilities nor the unnecessary ‘factory farming’ and slaughter of 
animals for food is morally acceptable.  
 
6.3 Human Beings Have a Duty of Care 
 
Thirdly, this being-in-relationship to all that is opens the way to articulating not only 
the idea that non-human animals have intrinsic worth as morally meaningful beings with 
whom human beings are in relationship, such that the realisation of our dignity rests in part in 
how we treat non-human animals (6.1), but, moreover, that non-human animals may have 
interests and rights that would translate into corresponding duties for human beings. I would 
propose that based on the multidimensional understanding of human dignity outlined here, 
there are the beginnings of an argument to say that humanity has a ‘duty of care’ towards 
other animals and the environment more generally. The details of how this duty of care might 
be worked out in practice is a matter for further investigation. 
 
